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Abstract: The Portuguese penitentiary system struggles to prevent recidivism, which 
results in the increasingly financially unsustainable hyper-incarceration. Therefore, the 
Free Works Social Impact Bond (SIB) addressing the causes of recidivism instead of 
symptoms represents an innovative, cost-efficient solution for authorities and investors. 
APAC Portugal’s program is a preventive, holistic model improving ex-convict’s 
employability, enabling them to break the vicious crime cycle. It provides repayments 
of 1,322,371.16€ and a 1.3% IRR, given the intervention’s 7.5% reduction in 
reconviction events. If the suggested improvements regarding recidivism data and the 
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The imprisonment rate continues to increase inexorably, leading to hyper-incarceration in 
Europe. This is not merely a result of rising crime levels. Approximately two-thirds of the 
increase is attributable to custodial sentences’ higher use (Cunneen et al. 2013). However, 
prisons fail to promote desistance among offenders. In any year, one-fifth of all criminal acts 
are committed by former inmates (Petersilia 2011). Therefore, hyper-incarceration becomes 
increasingly financially unsustainable while risking social cohesion (McLaughlin et al. 2016).  
The persistence of recidivism combined with rising governmental budget pressure and citizen’s 
call for outcome-based control have made SIBs increasingly attractive. The innovative 
financing tool focuses on preventing social problems such as recidivism. Even if public 
agencies could afford to enlarge prisons, preventive recidivism programs represent a more cost-
efficient solution. As a result, 138 impact bonds have been established worldwide, thereof 
twelve in criminal justice (Social Finance 2019). In Portugal, twelve SIBs have been funded 
by Portugal Social Innovation (PSI), a public initiative financing social innovation. Among 
them is the criminal justice SIB called Breaking Bars Farm. It aims to promote recidivism 
through social and labor integration (PSI 2020a). The Free Works program of APAC Portugal 
focuses on a similar rehabilitation approach in the Lisbon area, which aligns with Portugal’s 
public priority themes (PSI 2018). As PSI was recently searching for SIBs in the Lisbon area 
with a three million Euro allocation, this thesis will analyze the following research question:  
Is a SIB a feasible financing form for the Free Works intervention tackling recidivism? 
 
2 Methodology  
The feasibility study is structured into the following areas: 1) Definition of SIBs, 2) Portuguese 
penitentiary system, driving factors and effects of criminal recidivism, 3) Proposed 




A combination of academic papers on risk factors and costs of recidivism as well as reports 
from Portuguese and European agencies was used to assess the Portuguese penitentiary system 
and its current approach to prevent recidivism. As Portuguese official sources do not publish 
critical indicators such as recidivism rate or costs per offender, European sources were crucial 
for the whole thesis. Finally, a dynamic Excel model with Free Work SIB’s business case and 
various scenarios was created to determine if a SIB is feasible to fund the Free Works program.  
Throughout the thesis development, the researcher had mentoring sessions with Prof. António 
Miguel and Inês Charro (4 meetings) and contact with APAC Portugal (4 meetings). Especially 
with the head of the social impact area, Catarina Medeiros, and Free Work’s program lead, 
Inês Tavares, a collaborative relationship was developed over the semester. As a result, the 
researcher could validate Free Work as an effective intervention model to reduce recidivism. 
 
3 Social Impact Bonds 
SIBs are private-public financing models aimed at solving complex and costly social issues 
from an outcome-orientated perspective. They consist of contracts between the government, 
intermediary, service provider, and investors. The latter can encompass senior and subordinate 
lenders and grant-makers, which are not repaid regardless of the results. Investors provide 
investment up-front to fund preventive social programs targeting education, employment, 
healthcare, justice, social protection, or inclusion. The intermediary collects these funds, 
arranges a payment-by-results contract with public authorities, and manages the service 
provider. The latter then delivers its innovative, field-proven program to a target population. If 
the intervention reduces social challenges sustainably, which is determined by an evaluator, 
the government saves costs spent on the problems. As a result, a proportion of the savings can 




lose the funds invested. As the government merely pays for the intervention's success, SIBs are 
also known as Pay for Success Bonds (Marks and Weaver 2017; Klaassen 2017; Warner 2013).  
 
3.1 Advantages  
Due to its structure, SIBs encompass six critical advantages for the stakeholders mentioned: 
access to private capital to fund preventive interventions, risk transfer to investors, accelerated 
adoption of innovative programs, payment triggered by outcomes instead of activities, quality 
control, and investors’ ability to diversify portfolios while improving their reputation.  
Firstly, public authorities often underinvest prevention-focused social programs and pay for 
more costly remediation of the problem later. This primarily affects poor, underserved societal 
groups such as homeless, formerly incarcerated, and un- or undereducated persons lacking 
visibility and representation in the political system (Warner 2013). However, due to the high 
savings potential of preventive programs for the public, SIBs can pay a return if result targets 
are met without generating additional costs for public agencies. Therefore, private investors 
can be attracted to finance social interventions with a social and financial return and risk levels 
comparable to equity investments. As a result, SIBs can expand social service funding and 
improve societal outcomes on a large scale (Davies 2014; Marks and Weaver 2017). 
Secondly, as the government only pays for the intervention's success, the risks and costs of 
paying for ineffective services, budget management, and implementation are being transferred 
to private investors. SIBs should only be used when success is not sure, and thus risks can be 
transferred (Warner 2013). However, risk transfer is not the primary driver of governmental 
involvement. The possibility to circumvent strict budgets, procurement and political processes 
is a more critical factor (Gustafsson-Wright, Gardiner, and Putcha 2015). 
Thirdly, as a result of the risk transfer, SIBs encourage a culture of experimentation and 




effectively due to the continuous, thorough performance evaluation. Therefore, public policy 
reflecting these learnings can be implemented quicker and on a broader scale (Liebman 2011). 
Fourthly, SIBs shift the focus to measurable outcomes instead of inputs or outputs. By clearly 
defining result targets, and implementing performance management, the stakeholders have 
goal clarity, simplifying their complex arrangements (Warner 2013). 
Fifthly, as the investors and intermediary bear the failure risk, they have strong incentives to 
monitor and improve program quality before and throughout the intervention period. 
Moreover, private investors can contribute their business expertise (Davies 2014).  
Finally, investors can diversify their portfolio with a new asset class independent of the bond 
and equity markets while improving their reputation. Additionally, investors can utilize a tax 
benefit from investing in SIBs in Portugal. Under Law No. 114/2017, 130 percent of the 
investment can be recognized as an expense regardless of future payments (PSI 2019).  
 
3.2 Disadvantages 
Nevertheless, SIBs have essential drawbacks, namely several obstacles to attract private 
capital, the risk of cherry-picking target population, high complexity, and transaction costs. 
Firstly, due to investors’ high risk and relatively illiquid investment, SIBs have been unable to 
attract private capital from investors not primarily interested in social returns without 
substantial guarantees by a subordinate lender or grant-maker (Davies 2014; Warner 2013). 
For example, Goldman Sachs only invested in Riker Island’s SIB with the guarantee for 7.2 
out of 9.6 million US dollar investment from philanthropies (Olson and Phillips 2013).   
Secondly, the outcome focus creates adverse incentives for service providers to cherry-pick 
populations similar to other payment by result approaches. This means that participants with a 




which are ignored by the service provider. Moreover, the intervention could also over-focus on 
the outcome metric resulting in adverse effects for the population (Disley et al. 2016; 2011).  
Thirdly, SIBs are highly complex. To align goals, monitor performance management, limit 
risk, and conduct evaluation, SIBs rely on contracts to manage the complex partner 
relationships accordingly. Therefore, setting SIBs up is a complicated, time-consuming process 
involving high transaction costs (Gustafsson-Wright, Gardiner, and Putcha 2015). 
Nevertheless, SIBs tackling these drawbacks, by for example limiting the incentive for cherry-
picking, offer a win-win situation for public authorities and investors. By combining social 
outcomes with financial returns, performance management, and outcome-based payments, 
SIBs promote investment in cost-saving preventive programs (Liebman 2011). 
 
4 Social Problem of Recidivism 
4.1 Penitentiary System in Portugal And Its Limitations to Prevent Recidivism 
Portugal currently has 12,793 inmates supervised by the General Directorate of Reintegration 
and Prisons (DGRSP). Its 51 incarceration facilities (EPs) are structured into three different 
types: central (sentences of over six months), regional (sentences of under six months), and 
special prisons (e.g., juveniles, officers, or invalids) (Dores, Pontes, and Loureiro 2019).  
The Portuguese penitentiary system has three main improvement areas. Firstly, overcrowding 
in prisons, meaning that the number of inmates exceeds the available incarceration places, has 
been a problem since 1985 (Prison Project 2016). Despite measures aimed at reducing prison 
population such as amnesties, pardons, overstating official capacity of prisons, and increased 
use of non-custodial sentences, Portugal exceeded the European average for prison population 
rate per 100,000 inhabitants (125.2) and prison population density (93.6%) last year (DGRSP 
2019a). Over half of all prison facilities still exceed their limit of detention places, with 




average length of imprisonment of 31.7 months (Europe: 8 months; Council of Europe 2020) 
and presumably the high number of reoffenders populating Portugal’s EPs (UN 2018). 
Secondly, the increasing number of inmates combined with the lack of financial funding 
compromises health care, sufficient food quantity, and quality in prisons (Cotrim 2017).  
Thirdly, prisons face power problems and missing standardization between different 
institutions (Dores, Pontes, and Loureiro 2019). The damaging effects of the guard’s power on 
inmates’ education and professional training will be explained in the intervention model. 
As a result of overcrowding, inadequate prison conditions, and power problems, reintegration 
measures, e.g., individual rehabilitation plans, education, professional training, and 
employment, cannot be implemented effectively. This stands in contrast to the Portuguese 
penal system’s rehabilitation orientation besides serving incapacitation and deterrence 
functions1 (Law No.  115/2009, Decree-Law No. 265/79). It recognizes social reintegration as 
the core purpose of imprisonment, which is in line with Portugal’s priority policy themes, 
international human rights, and the United Nations’ (UN) prison standards (UN 2018). 
 
However, this poses the question if prisons are effective rehabilitative institutions. Current 
research shows that custodial sentences do not reduce recidivism more than community 
sentences and, on the contrary, can have criminogenic effects for low-risk offenders in 
particular. Incarceration shapes the offender’s attitudes towards violence, crime, identity, and 
peer networks, which are at risk of being radicalized (Cullen, Jonson, and Nagin 2011; 
McLaughlin et al. 2016). According to the experimental study from MacKenzie (2012), which 
assigned convicts randomly to either a prison or boot camp, both sanction types did not improve 
the criminogenic characteristics of inmates. In contrast, prisons had a crime-inducing impact 
 
1 Incapacitation states that the offender cannot commit crimes while in detention. Deterrence refers to the notion 




on the offender due to lacking rehabilitation programs, a hostile social learning environment 
created by interactions with other inmates, and poor living conditions. The latter can especially 
have a dehumanizing effect on inmates and lead to resentment towards society, resulting in an 
increasing amount or severity of recidivism (Katz, Levitt, and Shustorovich 2003).  
Recidivism, also used as a measure of correctional effectiveness, refers to a person’s relapse 
into criminal acts (measured by, e.g., self-report, rearrest, reconviction, or reimprisonment)2 
after receiving sanction for a prior offense (Jehle and Albrecht 2014). Even though most 
offenders intend to desist from crime (Shapland and Bottoms 2011), 75% of former inmates 
reoffend within five years, according to European statistics (Monteiro 2019). Recently released 
inmates are a high-risk group causing the majority of violent crimes. As a result, 43% are being 
reincarcerated within three years in the US, causing the well-known problem of the prison 
system’s revolving door (Pew Center 2011; Yukhnenko, Sridhar, and Fazel 2019).  
To efficiently tackle recidivism and the resulting revolving door of prisons, the following 
sections will analyze the static and dynamic risk factors of reoffending. 
 
4.2 Risk Factors For Recidivism 
A person’s relapse into crime depends on multiple variables. Following the UN’s definition, 
this section is divided into dynamic (meaning amendable to change) and static risk factors.  
Firstly, static risk factors encompass demographic and crime-related characteristics influencing 
recidivism rates. Gender and age belong to the former category. Current research shows that 
women are less likely to reoffend by 2.5 times (Jehle and Albrecht 2014). Moreover, most 
persons desist from crime when reaching their early thirties (Sapouna et al. 2015). Furthermore, 
crime-related characteristics include previous criminal history (80% of first-time offenders will 
not relapse into criminal acts), offense type, and sentence length (Jehle and Albrecht 2014).  
 




Secondly, dynamic risk factors can be divided into personal and social/economic problems. 
Personal problems such as substance addiction and mental health illness are widespread in the 
prison population and can cause higher recidivism rates (Petersilia 2011; Pew Center 2011). 
However, self-esteem and motivation to change promote successful desistance (Wilson and 
Lanskey 2015). Moreover, offenders face social stigmatizations and ostracism when returning 
to society. Negative public attitudes towards ex-convicts obstruct the person’s social and 
professional integration. Quality social networks formed through family, partners and stable 
employment can facilitate inclusion and reduce reoffending (Shapland and Bottoms 2011).  
Recidivism is also negatively impacted by interpersonal, professional, and formal skill deficits. 
Educational illiteracy is widespread in Portuguese prisons, with over half of inmates lacking 
primary education (DGRSP 2019b). Therefore, education and vocational training as a central 
element of rehabilitation can encourage desistance by enabling stable employment after release 
(Nally et al. 2014). Finding employment is an essential objective for former inmates, with 79% 
spending time searching for a job after their release (Visher, Debus, and Yahner 2008). 
However, their unemployment rate is approximately five times higher compared to the general 
population. Even if formerly incarcerated persons are employed, it is mostly in insecure, low 
paying jobs that put them below the poverty line (Couloute and Kopf 2018; US Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 2019). This results from stigmatization, weaker social networks, skill deficits, 
legal exclusion from certain professions, and a criminal record. The latter is a significant barrier 
to employment, as most employers are not willing to consider equally qualified applicants due 
to their criminal history. As a result, the callback ratio is 2:1 or 3:1 for persons without and 
with a criminal record for white and black, respectively (Pager 2003). Nevertheless, post-
release stable employment is the most critical predictor of recidivism regardless of the offense 
type. Besides providing a secure income source, employment offers stability, structure, and a 




skills and thus employment status is crucial for promoting their reintegration, desistance from 
crime, and thereby public safety at large (Visher, Debus, and Yahner 2008; Nally et al. 2014).  
Unless the described dynamic risk factors are addressed, formerly incarcerated persons are at 
risk of being trapped in a vicious cycle between (re-)conviction, social and economic rejection, 
failed integration, and recidivism (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Risk Factors, Resulting Vicious Cycle of Crime, and Costs of Recidivism 
 
Source: Own figure based on Cohen and Piquero (2009), Jehle and Albrecht (2014), McLaughlin et al (2016), Nally et al. (2014), Newton et 
al. (2019), Pager (2003), Penal Reform International (2018), UN (2018), Visher, Debus and Yahner (2008), and Wilson and Lanskey (2015) 
 
4.3 Costs of Recidivism 
Two areas are impacted by recidivism: public safety and socioeconomic costs for society. 
Firstly, recidivism creates more crime jeopardizing community safety and public confidence 
in the justice system (UN 2018; WHO 2014). 
Secondly, society’s costs can amount to 4.2 to 7.2 million US dollars per high-risk juvenile, 
who becomes a chronic offender (Cohen and Piquero 2009). To understand which major cost 
categories regarding recidivism can cause such high community costs, a distinction is made 




Costs in anticipation of crime are spent to limit an individual or businesses’ chance of becoming 
a victim, e.g., insurances, crime prevention, and defensive equipment (Newton et al. 2019).  
Additionally, costs as a consequence of crime encompass direct costs to individuals or 
businesses incurred because of the crime committed. It includes the value of the stolen 
property, lost effectiveness at work, and victim cost of crime, e.g., psychological and physical 
harm, which needs to be treated by health service (Heeks et al. 2018; UN 2018). 
Furthermore, costs as a response to crime are associated with criminal justice investigations, 
arrests, legal proceedings, and incarceration. In Portugal, 44.9€ are spent per day for the 
detention of one inmate. In total, this sums up to an estimated budget of approximately 216 
million € for all inmates (Council of Europe 2020). However, the budget does not cover costs 
regarding investigations, prosecutions, and legal proceedings. 
In addition to the described direct costs of crime, there are also indirect social costs for the 
community stemming from imprisoning offenders. It is estimated that the ratio between 
incarceration and social costs is 1:10, which are most likely to be borne by families, children, 
and the convict’s social networks, which did not offend (McLaughlin et al. 2016). Due to the 
convict’s absence, families suffer from higher evictions (resulting from the income loss), 
weakened health, and adverse effects on the children’s mental health, welfare costs (if placed 
in foster care), education, subsequent wages, homelessness, and criminality. It is estimated that 
seven out of ten children do not break the crime cycle (Inácio 2019; Cunneen et al. 2013). 
Furthermore, social welfare is also impacted by the opportunity cost of offenders’ time 
(foregone wages), reduced lifetime earnings due to lower wages after imprisonment, and ex-
inmates’ dependence on social services (McLaughlin et al. 2016; Cohen and Piquero 2009).  
 
Although most of the mentioned costs are not included in government budgets, their impact on 




5 A Successful Intervention Model 
5.1 Social Organization: APAC Portugal 
APAC Portugal strives to break the vicious cycle of crime and promote desistance with its 
rehabilitation programs. In 2019, the not-for-profit association supported 98 inmates in seven 
programs from three EPs. The revolutionary APAC concept from Brazil inspired the social 
organization. It aims to de-stigmatize and rehabilitate convicts by improving their social 
thinking, community involvement, skills, and responsibility. For example, APAC’s prisons are 
administrated by its inmates. As a result, the recidivism rate is merely 15 percent compared to 
a national average of 80 to 85 percent. While humanizing prisons, APAC also reduced 
incarceration costs by two-thirds (Wilson and Lanskey 2015; Justice Trends Magazine, n.d.).  
Following APAC’s methodology, APAC Portugal has eight core values ranging from human 
valuation to education (see Appendix 2). Based on these pillars, five rehabilitation programs 
for inmates have been developed: DMAIS, RHI, EtiPac, Labora, and Free Works, which all 
focus on different aspects to tackle recidivism. This paper will focus on the latter program.  
 
5.2 Intervention Program: Free Works  
Free Works aims to promote social inclusion by addressing the inmate’s professional skills and 
employability. Its three-step program is a cost-effective method to prevent recidivism. It 
includes 120 hours of training in the 18 months program inside and outside of the EP Caxias.  
The three phases of Free Works are called Ignite, Master It, and Free Works. Ignite is a 2-
month training of soft skills with volunteers inside of the EP. As over half of the Portuguese 
prison population did not finish their basic education3 (DGRSP 2019b), soft and interpersonal 
competencies are critical for the inmate’s employability after release. Master It consists of a 6-
 
3 Basic education consists of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd school cycle followed by secondary education with mandatory 




month hard skill training with Reshape Ceramics. Reshape Ceramics is a social innovation 
business created by APAC Portugal. It teaches them on-job skills crucial for labor market 
integration. Even though Portugal’s statutes set a comprehensive employment and vocational 
training program to support social reintegration, the penitentiaries often lack those (Dores, 
Pontes, and Loureiro 2019). Due to the shortage of jobs, no work obligation, and vocational 
training merely offered at a few facilities, one-third of the prison population is detained without 
any meaningful activity. If work or training is available, applicability in real-world settings is 
limited. Furthermore, withdrawal from training programs is widespread due to the guard’s 
obstructing methods and forcing participants to drop out (Maculan, Ronco, and Vianello 2013; 
European Prison Observatory 2019). As work experience and training while incarceration are 
known to promote better employment outcomes after release (Visher, Debus, and Yahner 
2008), Reshape Ceramics is critical for integrating and rehabilitating offenders. 
The two in-prison phases are followed by Freedom, a 12-month professional and social 
integration program after release. It includes job support and mentorships. APAC Portugal’s 
network of for-profit and social organizations creates suitable work opportunities for the 
participants despite their obstacles when returning to the community discussed before.  
Overall, the Free Works program is a holistic intervention due to its continuity of service and 
range of dynamic risk factors of recidivism addressed. Free Works starts before the offender’s 
release, supports his transition to society, and supports the integration for 12 months after 
release. Moreover, Free Works tackles multiple criminogenic needs of the offender: skill 
deficits, unemployment, low self-esteem, and social adaption issues (see Figure 2). 
The continuous training of soft and hard skills, work experience at Reshape Ceramics, and 
integration provide participants with the tools necessary to expand their potential, break the 




symptoms (e.g., by expanding already overcrowded prisons) are addressed. As a result, Free 
Works creates a safer, cohesive society and reduces public costs associated with recidivism.  
 
Figure 2: Program Structure and Impact of Free Works 
 
1: Result of improved skills and employability; Source: Own figure based on APAC Portugal (2019a) and APAC Portugal (2019b) 
 
5.3 Impact Assessment of Free Works 
As Free Works is currently in its first year of implementation, an impact assessment is currently 
not feasible. Therefore, Labora, another employability program from APAC Portugal, will be 
analyzed. Labora is a non-technical skill program, which includes role-play for job interviews, 
job search, and CV training. It aims to improve the inmate’s employability and motivation to 
keep a job. Starting in January 2019, Labora had eight participants for ten sessions in the first 
half of the year. Labora’s impact is measured by three components: the attendance rate, 
participant’s evaluation of sessions, and group maturity index. While the attendance rate was 
60 percent, the sessions’ evaluation was outstanding: 93 percent recommendation rate, 95 
percent satisfaction rate, and 90 percent evaluation rate overall. Moreover, the group maturity 
index measures participants’ empathy, helpfulness, openness, ability to deal with different 
opinions and conflicts. On average, the group maturity index increased by 3.5 points from 2.8 




to the programs’ similarities regarding methodology, employability, and skill-focus to promote 
reintegration, Free Work’s impact is likely to be comparable to Labora. 
 
6 Structure of Social Impact Bond Adapted to Free Works 
The structure of the Free Works SIB is outlined in Figure 3. The investors could also include 
the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, similar to previous SIBs in Portugal (Social Finance 
2019). Likewise, MAZE could be the intermediary. Furthermore, DGRSP is the public sector 
partner for social impact bonds focused on justice and social integration (PSI 2020b). The four 
parties, namely investors, intermediary, service provider, and public sector partner, form a 
partnership together monitoring relevance, public policy alignment, and performance. 
Moreover, the impact evaluation could be done by Nova SBE, similar to the Junior Code 
Academy SIB established as the first Portuguese SIB (Farinho 2018).  
 
Figure 3: Structure of Free Works SIB 
 




6.1 Target Population 
The target population includes male inmates from EP Caxias with a release date of 8 to 14 
months4. 8 months are necessary to complete the in-prison phases, and the intervention allows 
for a 6-month buffer to start the phase outside of prison. Moreover, participants should stay in 
Portugal after their release (e.g., by being Portuguese or having documents permitting their 
stay), have basic writing and reading skills, and favorably live in Lisbon. Additionally, the 
inmates’ first discharge in the cohort period must be from EP Caxias to avoid including persons 
released at another prison with a following sentence at EP Caxias (Anders and Dorsett 2017).  
These criteria ensure that Free Works affects a large, underserved population. More 
rehabilitation programs focus on female offenders, even though approximately 93.3 percent of 
all inmates are male (DGRSP 2019b). EP Caxias is one of the highest overpopulated facilities 
with a 136.7 percent occupancy rate (see Appendix 1). APAC Portugal has a collaborative 
relationship with EP Caxias, which has space for training and work areas. Furthermore, the 
third phase can be facilitated quicker and adapted to the conditions in Lisbon.  
Furthermore, to limit the service provider’s incentive to cherry-pick participants, the target 
population includes all inmates discharged from EP Caxias meeting the eligibility criteria 
regardless of their participation in the program. This encourages APAC Portugal to work with 
inmates most likely to reoffend and thus costly for society, which are otherwise at risk of being 
excluded from the service due to the focus on outcomes (Disley et al. 2016; Liebman 2011).  
 
6.2 Cohort Delivery Model And Intervention Timeline 
The Free Works SIB will include 270 participants divided into three cohorts (consisting of 90 
participants). This ensures the impact’s statistical significance, which can be clearly attributed 
 
4 Early release is granted for (1) inmates with less than a six-year sentence after half or two-thirds of the sentence 




to Free Works. It limits the risk of a false-positive (reduced recidivism due to other reasons) or 
false-negative result (reduction was achieved but not detected). Additionally, the comparison 
between cohorts is possible enabling adaption to the inmates’ needs. A smaller scale might also 
not deliver the significant cashable savings required to attract investors (Disley et al. 2011).  
Each cohort will go through the three phases: Ignite (2 months), Master It (6 months), and 
Freedom (12 months). To streamline interventions, the cohorts will overlap with each one 
starting if the former has two months left in the Master It phase (equal to the length of Ignite). 
According to the estimated releases at EP Caxias per month (18 persons per month)5, at least 
five months are needed to qualify 90 participants for the program. As savings primarily depend 
on the participant target being fulfilled (outlined in the scenario analysis), a 6-month buffer to 
get released and start the Freedom phase is included to even out any monthly fluctuations in 
releases. Additionally, an additional 6-months buffer is provided for courts to process offenses, 
which will be explained later. Finally, impact evaluation should be finished within a month. 
As a result, the intervention including buffer will operate for 3.75 years, starting on the 1st of 
September 2021 (start of school year) and ending on the 31st of May 2025 (see Appendix 4).  
 
6.3 Intervention Costs 
The intervention costs are equal to 777,629€ (see Appendix 5). The major cost categories are 
HR (manager, technical, and administrative), Reshape Ceramics (sale minus inmate’s wages), 
service delivery (training, equipment, and rent), impact assessment (Aidhound and evaluation), 
and miscellaneous (marketing and operating expenses). Most costs vary based on the phases 
besides admin., training, equipment, Aidhound, and operating expenses. However, merely 30 
percent of costs depends on the participant target being reached (see Appendix 6).  
 
5 In 2019, the 5,161 releases were equally distributed over 12,793 inmates in Portugal (assumption), EP Caxias 




6.4 Outcome Metric And Additional Measures 
The outcome metric is the reduction in reconviction events within 12 months after the release 
compared to a control group with Propensity Score Matching (PSM). The minimum reduction 
required to trigger payment is 7.5 percent across all cohorts, similar to the Peterborough SIB. 
Likewise, if a cohort reaches a 10 percent reduction, early payments are possible (Anders and 
Dorsett 2017). This results from the following four rationales: a clear indication of success, 
little incentive for cherry-picking, reasonable timeline, and credible impact assessment.  
Firstly, reconviction is a measure of recidivism. Compared to reoffending, it is relatively easy 
to measure as the information can be obtained from criminal records or police. It is likely to 
underestimate the real number of reoffenses (e.g., not reported to police, the suspect is not 
detected, prosecution or conviction has not taken place). However, the link between 
reconviction events and society’s costs is more vital. As this metric is more straightforward, 
simpler to measure, and directly linked to costs, it reduces the evaluation’s costs (Berlin 2016).  
Secondly, the number of reconviction events was chosen instead of a binary reconviction rate 
to avoid cherry-picking. Thereby, participants with a higher probability of reoffending can 
significantly influence the outcome metric, which triggers payment (Disley et al. 2016). 
Thirdly, the 12-month observation period was selected as recently released prisoners are a high-
risk group for reoffending. In France, 54.5 percent of reconvictions in a five-year period occur 
during the first year (Jehle and Albrecht 2014). Additionally, a buffer of 6 months for courts to 
process and convict crimes committed within the 12-months period is included (see Figure 4).  
Fourthly, a control group will be used due to the lack of Portuguese data. The control group 
offers a benchmark case in the intervention’s absence (Liebman 2011; Milner and Walsh 2016). 
Thereby, the program’s impact can be analyzed regardless of conditions influencing recidivism 
including employment, justice system, social security benefits, or housing (Davies 2014).  




Works will use a PSM control group. No interested inmate should be excluded from the service 
to serve as a control. In the PSM process, each cohort member will be matched with ten inmates 
from other prisons based on similar characteristics6 (Anders and Dorsett 2017).  
 
Figure 4: Counting Methodology For Reconviction Events in Cohort 1 
 
Source: Own figure based on Disley et al. (2016), Ministry of Justice UK (2020a), and Newton et al. (2019) 
 
 
Three other metrics not triggering payment will also be monitored: finding and maintaining 
employment, wages, and engagement. The collected data can improve the service and measure 
benefits otherwise missed (Gustafsson-Wright, Gardiner, and Putcha 2015; Berlin 2016): 
1. Finding and maintaining employment promotes desistance. Therefore, the binary 
measure of employment and percentage of time working since release will be recorded, 
similar to other criminal justice SIBs (Visher, Debus, and Yahner 2008).  
2. According to McLaughlin (2016), the lower the wage, the more likely is a person’s 
relapse into criminal behavior. Thus, the pay for the participant’s job will be monitored.  
3. Following the REACH SIB from the US, the program engagement will be measured, 
identifying participants’ satisfaction with the intervention (Social Finance 2019). 
 
6 The PSM model includes age, nationality, type and length of offenses, and criminal history, e.g., age at first 




6.5 Payment Structure 
Payment to investors depends on the program’s impact (7.5 or 10 percent reduction in 
reconviction events per person estimated to be 3.99), the number of offenders (270 in total), 
and the unit cost of reconviction for society (approximately 15.725.55€).  
As a learning from the Riker Island SIB, societal benefits additional to governmental budget 
savings are also included in the unit cost of reconviction (Berlin 2016). Therefore, the latter is 
based on UK reoffenses costs per offense group (includes costs in anticipation, as a 
consequence and as a response to crime; Newton et al. 2019) and social costs, which are 
estimated to be ten times higher than incarceration costs (McLaughlin et al. 2016). The unit 
costs per offense group are adapted to reflect Portuguese levels7 (see Appendix 7), which are 
then multiplied with their share of total crimes registered in Portugal (see Appendix 8; DGPJ 
2020) to reflect the average cost per reoffense: 15,725.55€.  
The program’s impact is based on the number of reconvictions per person within 12 months. 
As Portuguese authorities fail to publish any recidivism data, the UK annual average of 3.998 
of reconvictions per male adult within 12 months will be assumed (Ministry of Justice UK 
2020b). The UK and Portugal’s prison system are reasonably alike: a high, rising population 
rate combined with decreasing resources leading to overcrowding and poor conditions (e.g., 
limited rehabilitation), and inmate’s characteristics such as age, gender, and most common 
offense types (Silvestri 2013; Maculan, Ronco, and Vianello 2013). Moreover, both countries 
prioritize rehabilitation in their public policy (Ministry of Justice 2018; Inácio 2019).  
As a result, the Free Works SIB’s projected surplus is equal to 496,141€ or 920,730 € for a 7.5 
or 10 percent reduction in reconviction events for 270 participants (all three cohorts), 
respectively (see Table 5).  
 
7 In particular, the correction costs were adapted to reflect comparatively higher costs in Portugal due to the long 
average length of imprisonment, which is approximately 4.7x higher than in the UK (Council of Europe 2020).  




Table 5: Calculation of Savings Potential of Free Works SIB 
 
Source: Own table based on Ministry of Justice UK (2020b) and Newton et al. (2019) 
 
6.6 Public Sector Value 
In addition to the net savings calculated above, which also reduce the government’s future 
recidivism costs, there are additional benefits of the Free Works SIB for the public sector: 
1. Public safety and confidence in the justice system are improved. 
2. Public authority spends less on other rehabilitation programs, which might prove to be 
ineffective (Liebman 2011). 
3. A culture of innovation and experimentation is fostered. For example, other social 
organizations adopted successful elements from the Peterborough SIB. Additionally, 
the collected data was used to learn, monitor, and adapt service delivery to all prisoners 
at the Peterborough prison. As a result, broader and more effective services were 
implemented (Disley et al. 2011).  
4. Reshape Ceramics provides two benefits for the public sector regarding its payment 
and profit structure. Ten percent of the inmates’ salaries are donated to a fund working 
Savings for Society and Payments to Investors   
Average unit cost for reconvictions (in €)              15,725.55    
Average number of reconvictions per ex-convict                       3.99    
# of reconviction events for 270 participants   
Without intervention                1,078.00    
With 7.5% reduction                   997.00    
Difference                     81.00    
With 10% reduction                   970.00    
Difference                   108.00    
Savings from prevented reconviction events for 270 participants (in €)   
7.5% reduction         1,273,769.37    
10% reduction         1,698,359.16    
Intervention cost            777,628.68    
Project surplus   
7.5% reduction            496,140.69    




with crime victims. Furthermore, 40 percent of Reshape Ceramic’s profits fund other 
rehabilitation programs from APAC Portugal. This results in reduced governmental 
costs, improved aggregate welfare, and a more cohesive society. 
 
6.7 Investment Structure 
Timing and investor capital requirement 
The total up-front investor requirements equal 857,335.62€ for the base case with a 7.5 percent 
reduction in reconviction events. This includes the service delivery costs, intermediary costs, 
and working capital reserve. The investor requirement is in line with the 723,500€ raised for 
Coding Bootcamp SIB for only 174 participants (Anselmo and Charro 2020). Due to the 
streamlined intervention structure, payments are not feasible until the first cohort’s evaluation 
is completed. Furthermore, the payments cannot be recycled in the base case, meaning 
reinvested into the intervention, as they occur after all three cohorts are finished.   
 
Working capital contingency 
A small working capital contingency of three months is included in the financial model to avoid 
working capital shortages due to unforeseen changes or delays. The capital buffer will be paid 
back to the investors after the intervention is finished. 
 
Repayment 
There are up to three separate payment periods depending on the outcomes of each cohort. 
Total repayments can vary between 1,322,371.16€ (for a 7.5 percent reduction over all cohorts) 
to 1,699,398.95€ (for a 10% reduction over all cohorts).  
The earliest possible repayment of 498,309.93€ will occur on the 1st of September 2024, 




The significant lag in time is attributable to five factors:  
1. The service delivery without buffers already accounts for approximately 20 months. 
2. Based on estimated discharge rates at EP Caxias, six months are required to qualify a 
sufficient number of inmates (90 per cohort) for the Free Works program. 
3. The reconviction events are monitored over the 12 months plus an additional six months 
for courts to process and convict offenders from the observation period. 
4. An independent evaluator needs one month to assess the intervention’s outputs. 
5. The financial model allows for a two-month delay until revenues become cashable. 
It is also important to note that 130% of the investments into SIBs can be recognized as an 
expense disregarding any future repayments under Law 114/2017 (PSI 2019).  
 
7 Business Case and Scenario Analysis 
In the base case, the Free Works SIB achieves a 1.3% IRR with a total repayment of 
1,322,371.16€, given the average number of reconvictions is reduced by at least 7.5% over all 
cohorts. This represents a higher IRR than several SIBs in Portugal, such as Academia de 
Código Bootcamps, Faz-te Forward, or Projeto Família (Social Finance 2019). However, there 
are four different, better cases depending on each cohort’s reduction of reconvictions: (1) 10% 
reduction in second cohort, 7.5% in other cohorts, (2) 10% reduction in first cohort, 7.5% in 
other cohorts, (3) 10% reduction in first two cohorts, 7.5% in last cohort, and (4) 10% reduction 
over all cohorts. This results in more attractive repayments for investors of up to 1,699,398.95€ 
with an 11.8% IRR (for 10 percent reduction in all cohorts; see Appendix 9).  
To test different assumptions in the financial model, two different scenarios based on the base 
case of 7.5 percent reconviction reduction are developed in the following. 
The first scenario analysis focuses on achieving the participant target. As discussed previously, 




relies on estimated release data from EP Caxias. While savings primarily depend on the 
participant target being fulfilled, only 30 percent of intervention costs depend on the number 
of inmates participating. As the project surplus, repayment, and IRR rely heavily on fulfilling 
the participant target (see Table 6), recruiting enough participants per cohort is critical. Given 
estimated release data at EP Caxias, the 6-month buffer (for inmates to get released and start 
the Freedom phase) is sufficient to even out fluctuations and thus avoids savings losses.  
 
 
 Table 6: Scenario Analysis Based on Fulfilled Participants Target 
 Source: Own table 
 
The second scenario analysis tests the assumption of a 6-months buffer to start the Freedom 
phase. The quicker participants start the Freedom phase (and thus do not use the buffer), the 
quicker the intervention is finished, and cashable savings can be realized (see Table 7). 
 
Table 7: Scenario Analysis Based on Buffer to Start Freedom 
Source: Own table 
Base case: 7.5% reduction of reconviction events over all three cohorts 
Fulfilled participants target  100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Maximum Contract Value 1.273.769,37 1.273.769,37 1.273.769,37 
Buffer to start freedom  6 months 3 months 0 months 
Delivery costs 777.628,68 755.016,68 744.804,68 
Costs for intermediary 31.105,15 31.105,15 31.105,15 
Investor Requirement 857.335,62 834.723,62 824.511,62 
Project surplus 496.140,69 518.752,69 528.964,69 
IRR of project  1,3% 2,5% 3,6% 
Base case: 7.5% reduction of reconviction events over all three cohorts 
Fulfilled participants target  100,0% 90,0% 80,0% 
Maximum Contract Value 1.273.769,37 1.146.392,43 1.019.015,49 
Buffer to start freedom  6 months 6 months 6 months 
Delivery costs 777.628,68 754.608,71 731.588,75 
Costs for intermediary 31.105,15 31.105,15 31.105,15 
Investor Requirement 857.335,62 834.315,65 811.295,69 
Project surplus 496.140,69 391.783,72 287.426,75 




8 Limitations and Recommendations 
The Free Works SIB has three main limitations: reconviction only captures a small array of 
real recidivism, its savings are calculated based on UK data adapted to Portugal, and the proven 
impact of the intervention program Free Works is limited.  
The first limitation is that reconviction events are likely to underestimate actual reoffending 
rates. However, the real recidivism rate is hard to uncover as the only data source for all repeat 
offenses, including the dark figure, is the criminal’s self-report (Jehle and Albrecht 2014). 
Furthermore, the reconviction rate is closely linked to society’s savings (Disley et al. 2016). 
The second limitation is the lack of official information in Portugal. As the savings were 
estimated on UK data adapted to reflect Portuguese levels, it remains unclear if they reflect the 
Free Works SIB’s actual savings potential. Additionally, the closest measurement found to the 
number of reconviction events was the number of reoffenses per offender.  
Finally, Free Works proven impact is somewhat limited, which is critical for investors. Due to 
the program’s novelty, Labora’s impact was assessed. However, the information on Labora 
was also limited. Therefore, the impact is analyzed for three factors. Furthermore, based on 
Riker Island SIB learnings, additional impact evaluation should be conducted: e.g., the number 
of sessions/phases associated with positive outcomes and the number of inmates currently 
participating the number of sufficient or all sessions/phases (Berlin 2016).  
Therefore, there are two main improvement areas, which should be tackled going forward: 
1. Obtain or create reliable Portuguese data on recidivism and its costs to estimate savings 
potential for Free Works SIB credibly. Ideally, the data should be provided, verified, or 
accepted by the Portuguese public authorities (e.g., DGRSP). 
2. Conduct a robust impact assessment of the Free Works program, ensuring investors’ 
and intermediaries’ buy-in. The impact evaluation could for example encompass the 




9 Concluding Remarks  
Prevention of recidivism and social integration is one of Portugal’s priority public policy 
themes (PSI 2018). However, the Portuguese penitentiary system has limited success in 
promoting rehabilitation due to overcrowding, lack of financial resources, unfavorable prison 
conditions, and insufficient access to work and vocational training. The resulting recidivism 
and hyper-incarceration impose an enormous financial burden on the government.  
Addressing the root causes of the social problem, meaning the risk factors of recidivism, 
through a SIB instead of the symptoms (e.g., building and enlarging prisons) represents an 
innovative solution promoting public safety, a more cohesive society, and governmental 
savings. The Free Works program is a holistic intervention tackling multiple criminogenic 
needs of offenders, namely skill deficits, unemployment, low self-esteem, and social adaption 
issues. As it focuses on improving their employability, the intervention provides ex-convicts 
with the means and tools to break the vicious cycle of crime and desist in the long term. 
Furthermore, while limiting the service provider’s incentive to cherry-pick its target population 
(with the outcome metric and eligibility criteria), the Free Works SIB also provides repayments 
to investors of 1,322,371.16€ to 1,699,398.95€ with a 1.3% to 11.8% IRR.  
Overall, the Free Works SIB is an attractive financing model for public authorities and 
investors. If the two main improvement recommendations, reliable Portuguese data on 
recidivism and strong proven impact of Free Works, are implemented, the Free Works SIB 
would be feasible. As a result, it would be highly recommended to implement the Free Works 
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Appendix 1: Population And Occupation Rate Per Prison Facility 
Prison Establishments Total Population  
% of inmates 
of total Capacity 
Occupancy 
rate (in %) 
EP Alcoentre 544 4% 626 86,9 
EP Carregueira 748 6% 732 102,2 
EP Caxias 544 4% 398 136,7 
EP Coimbra 565 4% 540 104,6 
EP Funchal 289 2% 324 89,2 
Setor Feminino 10 0% 25 40,0 
EP Izeda 320 3% 301 106,3 
EP Leiria Jovens 182 1% 347 52,4 
EP Linhó 424 3% 584 72,6 
EP Lisboa 820 6% 887 92,4 
EP Monsanto 91 1% 202 45,0 
EP Paços de Ferreira 663 5% 548 121,0 
EP Pinheiro da Cruz 616 5% 645 95,5 
EP Porto 978 8% 686 142,6 
EP Santa Cruz do Bispo 
Feminino 299 2% 352 84,9 
EP Santa Cruz do Bispo 
Masculino 193 2% 220 87,7 
Clínica Psiquiátrica e Saúde 
Mental  164 1% 154 106,5 
EP Setúbal 198 2% 162 122,2 
EP Sintra 571 4% 767 74,4 
EP Tires 421 3% 470 89,6 
Setor Masculino 0 0% 163 0,0 
EP Vale de Judeus 527 4% 560 94,1 
EP Vale do Sousa 373 3% 374 99,7 
Hospital Prisional S. João de 
Deus 64 1% 195 32,8 
EP Angra do Heroísmo 257 2% 342 75,1 
Setor Feminino 12 0% 8 150,0 
Cadeia de apoio da Horta 15 0% 17 88,2 
EP Aveiro 120 1% 82 146,3 
EP Beja 209 2% 162 129,0 
EP Braga 123 1% 91 135,2 
EP Bragança 83 1% 58 143,1 
EP Caldas da Rainha 95 1% 80 118,8 
EP Castelo Branco 148 1% 141 105,0 
EP Chaves 71 1% 55 129,1 




EP Elvas 70 1% 53 132,1 
EP Évora 31 0% 35 88,6 
EP Faro 133 1% 103 129,1 
EP Guarda 213 2% 182 117,0 
Extensão Mondego 44 0% 82 53,7 
EP Guimarães 106 1% 73 145,2 
EP Lamego 79 1% 65 121,5 
EP Leiria 154 1% 111 138,7 
EP Montijo 186 1% 148 125,7 
EP Odemira 50 0% 56 89,3 
EP Olhão 50 0% 50 100,0 
EP PJ Lisboa 134 1% 116 115,5 
EP PJ Porto 29 0% 48 60,4 
EP Ponta Delgada 145 1% 141 102,8 
EP Silves 73 1% 58 125,9 
EP Torres Novas 56 0% 38 147,4 
EP Viana do Castelo 68 1% 42 161,9 
EP Vila Real 91 1% 67 135,8 
EP Viseu 83 1% 67 123,9 
Total 12.634   12.934 97,7 
Non-custodial psychiatric 
institutions  159 1%     
National Total 12.793       
 










Appendix 2: Values of APAC Portugal 
 
Source: Own figure based on APAC Portugal (2019a; 2019b)  
 
Appendix 3: Group Maturity Index of Labora 
 








What level of knowledge to the group 
members have of each other? 
4,0 8,0 4,0 100% 
What the level of empathy in the group? 3,0 8,0 5,0 167% 
What the level of mutual help in the 
group? 
2,0 6,0 4,0 200% 
How open/comfortable are group 
members to share personal stories? 
3,0 7,0 4,0 133% 
Are group members able to deal with 
disparate opinions in the group? 
5,0 7,0 2,0 40% 
Do conflicts exists within in the group? 0,0 2,0 2,0 200% 
Average 2,8 6,3 3,5 124% 
 






Appendix 4: Intervention Timeline 
 
 




Appendix 5: Intervention Costs per Year (in €) 
  2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 
HR           
Project Manager 18.160 54.480 38.590 22.700 - 
Technical  19.800 112.200 118.800 46.200 - 
Administrative/Accounting  5.192 15.576 15.576 12.980 - 
Total Costs 43.152 182.256 172.966 81.880 - 
Reshape Ceramics      
Sale 59.194 355.162 118.387 - - 
Wage Costs 76.500 459.000 153.000 - - 
Total Costs 17.306 103.838 34.613 - - 
Service delivery      
Seminars and Training 10.125 10.125 10.125 - - 
Movable equipment 14.175 - - - - 
Rents and amortizations 800 7.200 9.600 8.000 - 
Total Costs 25.100 17.325 19.725 8.000 - 
Tracking/Impact       
Aidhound 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 - 
Impact evaluation - - - 20.000 10.000 
Total Costs 2.500 2.500 2.500 22.500 10.000 
Miscellaneous      
Marketing for project 2.600 6.000 2.400 2.000 - 
Current operating expenses 1.944 5.832 5.832 4.860 - 
Total Costs 4.544 11.832 8.232 6.860 - 
TOTAL 92.602 317.751 238.036 119.240 10.000 
 












Appendix 6: Cost Structure (in €) 
  Cost structure 
Costs for  
2021-2025 
Share of total 
costs 
HR       
Project Manager Fixed 133.930 17% 
Technical  Fixed 297.000 38% 
Administrative/Accounting  Fixed 49.324 6% 
Total Costs  480.254 62% 
Reshape Ceramics    
Sale Variable 532.743  
Wage Costs Variable 688.500  
Total Costs  155.757 20% 
Service delivery    
Seminars and trainings Variable 30.375 4% 
Movable equipment Fixed 14.175 2% 
Rents and amortizations Variable 25.600 3% 
Total Costs  70.150 9% 
Tracking/Impact assessment    
Aidhound Fixed 10.000 1% 
Impact evaluation Fixed 30.000 4% 
Total Costs  40.000 5% 
Miscellaneous    
Marketing for project Fixed 13.000 2% 
Current operating expenses Variable 18.468 2% 
Total Costs  31.468 4% 
 












Appendix 7: Unit Costs of Reoffenses by Offense Group And Cost Category Adapted to 





















340,71 9.312,73 1.859,93 4.177,30 18.599,32 32.430,05 
Sexual 
offenses 227,14 9.085,59 72,82 3.417,79 728,16 13.458,68 








113,57 1.022,13 222,45 1.139,26 2.224,47 4.499,43 
Fraud 
offenses 227,14 1.022,13 16,51 379,75 165,11 1.794,13 
Public order 
offenses 113,57 567,85 155,92 949,39 1.559,22 3.190,02 
Drug offenses - 340,71 249,47 1.519,02 2.494,75 4.354,47 
Summary 




- - 187,11 1.139,26 1.871,06 3.010,32 
Summary 
motoring - - 62,37 379,75 623,69 1.003,44 
 
1: Exchange rate £ to € (2017-2018): 1,1356990 (OFX 2020) 
2: Costs in anticipation of crime, costs as a consequence of crime and costs in response to crime besides correction costs can be transferred 
from UK to Portugal 
3: Correction costs were adapted to higher correction costs in Portugal due to the long average length of imprisonment: approximately 4.7x 
higher than in the UK (Council of Europe 2020) 
4: For every dollar in corrections costs, incarceration generates an additional ten dollars in social costs (McLaughlin et al. 2016) 






Appendix 8: Crime Registered by Law Enforcement by Offense Group (2018) 
Offense group # of offenses recorded Share of total offenses 
Robbery 45.481 14% 
Violence against the person 78.657 23% 
Sexual offenses 2.621 1% 
Theft offenses 77.835 23% 
Miscellaneous crimes against society 12.615 4% 
Criminal damage and arson 22.967 7% 
Fraud offenses 38.879 12% 
Public order offenses 6.468 2% 
Drug offenses 8.466 3% 
Summary non-motoring 1.315 0% 
Possession of weapons offenses 11.522 3% 
Summary motoring 28.767 9% 
Total 335.593 100% 
 

















Appendix 9: Scenario Analysis Based on Reduction in Reconviction Events 
Reduction of average # of 
reconviction events 
7.5% over all three 
cohorts 
Fulfilled participants target 100% 
Maximum Contract Value 1.273.769,37 
Buffer to start freedom  6 months  
Delivery costs 777.628,68 
Costs for intermediary 31.105,15 
Investor Requirement 857.335,62 
Project surplus 496.140,69 
IRR of project  1,3% 
 
 
Reduction of average # of 
reconviction events 
10% in 2nd cohort,  
7.5% in others 
10% in 1st cohort,  
7.5% in others 
Fulfilled participants target 100% 100% 
Maximum Contract Value 1.415.299,30 1.415.299,30 
Buffer to start freedom 6 months 6 months 
Delivery costs 777.628,68 777.628,68 
Costs for intermediary 31.105,15 31.105,15 
Investor Requirement 847.335,62 809.773,62 
Project surplus 637.670,62 637.670,62 
IRR of project  4,6% 5,9% 
 
Reduction of average # of 
reconviction events 
10% in first two cohorts, 
7.5% in last 
10% over all three cohorts 
Fulfilled participants target 100% 100% 
Maximum Contract Value 1.556.829,23 1.698.359,16 
Buffer to start freedom 6 months 6 months 
Delivery costs 777.628,68 777.628,68 
Costs for intermediary 31.105,15 31.105,15 
Investor Requirement 809.773,62 809.773,62 
Project surplus 779.200,54 920.730,47 
IRR of project 9,3% 11,8% 
 
Source: Own table  
